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Collateral Estoppel: Offensive assertion of collateral
estoppel allowed.
In B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,88 the Court of Appeals was
faced with the problem of whether to allow a party to use the
doctrine of collateral estoppel offensively. The defendant's jeep
had collided with a vehicle owned by plaintiff and driven by
one Farum. Farnum sued for personal injuries, and recovered
a $5,000 verdict. Subsequently, plaintiff brought this cause of
action for $8,250 in property damages and moved for summary
judgment upon the ground that the judgment in Farnum's suit
was res judicata of the issues (with the exception of damages).
The Court held:
[W]here the issues .

.

. were no broader and no different than those

raised in the first lawsuit; where the defendant here offers no reason
for not holding him to the determination in the first action; where
it is unquestioned (and probably unquestionable) that the first action
was defended with full vigor and opportunity to be heard; and where
the plaintiff in the present action, the owner of the vehicle, derives
his right to recovery from the plaintiff in the first action, the operator
of said vehicle, although they do not technically stand in the relationship of privity, there is no reason either in policy or precedent to
hold that the judgment in the Farnurn case is not conclusive in the
present action ....

89

The use of collateral estoppel by a plaintiff on the issue of
negligence has been permitted in prior cases.90 However, two
"requirements" for such use posited by the Court in DeWitt
are worthy of consideration. First, the Court stated that it must
be "unquestioned" that the first action had been vigorously
defended. In the instant case, it is reasonable to assume that
the defense offered in Farnum's $5,000 personal injury action
was as vehement as that which the defendant would have offered
had he been allowed to defend the present action for $8,250
(although this is necessarily conjectural). If, however, a case
arose where the damages in the first action were substantially less
88 19
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N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 148, 225 N.E.2d 195, 199,
278 90N.Y.S.2d 596, 601-02 (1967).
E.g., United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D.
Nev. 1962); Liberty Mut. Ins., Co. v. George Colon & Co., 260 N.Y. 305,
183 N.E. 506 (1932); United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 272 App. Div. 951,
71 N.Y.S.2d 696 (4th Dep't), aff'd viem., 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626
(1947). Contra, Elder v. New York & Pa. Motor Exp., 284 N.Y. 350,
31 N.E.2d 188 (1940); Quatroche v. Consolidated Edison, 11 App. Div. 2d
665, 201 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1st Dep't 1960). See Note, Collateral Estoppel in
New York, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1158, 1166 (1961).
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than in the subsequent action, it is probable that the defendant
would have defended more vigorously had the two actions been
tried together from the outset- e.g., the first suit was for an
amount that made it inconvenient and impractical for the defendant9t
to have amassed all the evidence needed for an airtight defense.
This would usually arise where the first action was for a small
amount of property damages and the second for substantial personal injuries (although this is not necessarily so, as evidenced
by the facts in the main case).
In a similar vein, a court may face a situation wherein the
two actions are against the same defendant, yet two separate
liability carriers are involved. It would not seem fair to bind
defendant's insurer for property damage claims with an unsuccessful defense directed by defendant's personal injury liability
insurer. Both these problems are noted in the persuasive dissent
of Judge Breitel in DeWitt.
The second problem in attempting to ascertain the impact
of the instant case involves the Court's statement that the second
cause of action must be "derivative" of the first action. A derivative cause of action has been defined as one "coming from
another; . . . that which has not origin in itself but owes its

existence to something foregoing." 92 It does not seem that the
owner of a car "derives" his right to recover for property damages
from the right of the driver to recover for personal injuries,
in the above sense. Probably, the meaning of the statement
"derives his right" is that there was a close relationship between
the first and second plaintiffs, i.e., driver- owner. The obvious
question is whether the Court would have considered a passenger's
relationship to the driver a sufficient nexus. If the Court were
to answer this question in the affirmative, it would follow logically
to extend the offensive use of collateral estoppel to situations like
the perennial hypothetical train wreck. A train carrying one
hundred passengers crashes. Fifty passengers sue separately for
negligence, and, in each case, the defendant is absolved of guilt.
93
The fifty-first passenger, possibly because he is an infant, recovers a verdict against the defendant from a sympathetic jury.
The defendant could not use the fifty adjudications of its innocence against the remaining forty-nine passengers, since they
never had an opportunity to litigate the issue of defendant's
negligence themselves. However, a broad interpretation of the
instant case could allow the remaining forty-nine to receive
summary judgment on the issue of defendant's negligence, based
91 See 32
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L. IEv. 428, 431 (1966).
530 (4th ed. 1951).
L. REv., supra note 91.
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upon the single recovery by the infant passenger, if it is shown
that defendant vigorously litigated that case. Such a result would
be difficult to justify either in logic or in law.
The Court of Appeals cannot be charged with intending such
a broad construction of its holding. What it intended, apparently,
was to establish the principle that, given a proper situation, a
plaintiff could have the benefit of collateral estoppel. What will
constitute such a proper case must be left to the wisdom of the
lower courts and to future decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Collateral Estoppel: Defensive assertion of collateral estoppel.
The question of when to allow the defense of collateral estoppel
is still far from a definitive answer in New York, especially with
regard to its use by joint tortfeasors. Two recent cases, MacGilfrey
v. Hotaling94 and Terwilliger v. Terwilliger"9 turned upon this
question.
Both cases involved automobile accidents and presented similar
factual situations. In each, P , (passenger in car number one)
sued D r (driver of car number one) and D, (driver of car
number two) for negligence, and recovered against both drivers.
In a subsequent suit, D , sued D,,, and D sought to invoke the
defense of collateral estoppel, i.e., since D 1 was found negligent
as to P 1 he should be estopped to deny his contributory negligence
as to his own injuries arising from the same accident. In each
case, the court refused to allow the defense.
Glaser v. Huette 96 established the rule in New York that
prevented the defensive use of collateral estoppel in a subsequent
action between parties who were codefendants in a prior action.
The Glaser court reasoned that since the parties to the second
action were not adversaries in the first action, there was no duty
to defend against each. other in the first action, and, therefore, they
could relitigate the issue of negligence as between themselves.
Subsequent to the Glaser decision, the Court of Appeals
abolished technical requirements as to the defensive use of collateral
estoppel, and established the rule that it could be used when the
issues were identical and when the party against whom the defense
was being asserted had had his day in court on the issue.9 7 However, in cases involving joint tortfeasors, New York courts, including the Court of Appeals, have continued to follow the Glaser rule
without considering whether the "identity of issues plus opportunity
App. Div. 2d 977, 274 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dep't 1966).
95 52 Misc. 2d 404, 276 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1966).
96232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y. Supp. 374 (1st Dep't), aff'd twin., 256
N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931).
97 Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1956).
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